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THE TORT OF BAD FAITH BREACH
OF CONTRACT: WHEN, IF AT ALL,
SHOULD IT BE EXTENDED BEYOND
INSURANCE TRANSACTIONS?
THOMAS A. DIoND*
I. INTRODUCTION
Implied as a matter of law within every contract is a cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing requiring that neither
party do anything which will injure the right of the other to
receive the benefits of the agreement.' Through application of
this covenant, a breach of contract may be found when a
promisor, by his bad faith conduct, has jeopardized or de-
stroyed a promisee's opportunity to reap the expected benefit
of the bargain, even though that conduct failed to violate ex-
pressed provisions of the agreement.2 In recent years, courts
in several jurisdictions have given this implied covenant extra-
contractual relevancy by holding the breach thereof to be tor-
tious,3 thereby permitting the injured promisee remedial relief
* Professor of Law, Whittier College School of Law. B.S., University of Penn-
sylvania; L.L.B., University of California, Los Angeles; LL.M., New York University
School of Law.
1. 3 A. CORBIN, CONMRACTS § 541, at 97 (1960); 5 S. WMLISTON, A TRFATI E ON THE
LAW OF CoNTRACrs § 670, at 159 (3rd ed. 1961); Summers, "Good Faith" in General
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L.
REv. 195, 232-52 (1968); U.C.C. § 1-203; Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564,
212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949); Martindell v. Lake Shore Nat'l Bank, 15 Ml. 2d 272, 286, 154
N.E.2d 683, 690 (1958); Van Valkenburgh, Nooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publish-
ing Co., 30 N.Y. 2d 34, 45, 281 N.E.2d 142, 144, 330 N.Y.S.2d 329, 333, cert. denied,
409 U.S. 875 (1972); Shaw v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 126 Vt. 206, 209, 226
A.2d 903, 906 (1967).
2. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 234 (1968).
3. See, e.g., United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28, 33 (Alaska 1974);
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 573-74, 510 P.2d 1032, 1036, 108 Cal.
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that would not have been available in an action founded on
contract,4 including damages for mental suffering, economic
Rptr. 480, 484-85 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 432, 426 P.2d 173,
178, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (1967); Grand Sheet Metal Prods. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins.
Co., 34 Conn. Supp. 46, -, 375 A.2d 428, 430 (1977); Lange v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of
N.Y., 290 Minn. 61, 185 N.W.2d 881, 885 (1971); First Security Bank v. Goddard, 593
P.2d 1040, 1047 (Mont. 1979); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev.
617, 620, 540 P.2d 1070, 1071 (1975); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Montoya, 90 N.M. 556, 557,
566 P.2d 106, 107 (Ct. App. 1977); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester
Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638, 643 (N.D. 1979); Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co., 28 Ohio Misc.
44, 46, 273 N.E.2d 919, 921 (1970); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577
P.2d 899, 904 (Okla. 1978); Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 346, 349 (Utah
1979); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d. 675, 686, 271 N.W.2d 368, 374
(1978).
4. See text accompanying notes 34-37 infra.
5. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 579-80, 510 P.2d 1032,
1041, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 489 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433,
426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 (1967); Christian v. American Home Assurance
Co., 577 P.2d 899, 904 (Okla. 1978); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675,
695-96, 271 N.W.2d 368, 378 (1978).
Recovery for emotional distress arising from defendant's tortious conduct has
been limited by policy considerations inherent in the various causal requirements for
damages resulting from tortious conduct. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ToRs § 43, at 257 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965);
Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1961). Tradition-
ally, there has been a reluctance to permit recoveries for emotional distress absent
physical injury or impact so as to protect against fictitious claims. 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.4, at 1031-32 (1956); C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 89(b), at 319-22 (1935); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 54, at 328-29 (4th ed. 1971).
Insurance bad faith breach cases have permitted recovery for emotional distress
despite the absence of impact or injury when the bad faith breach caused substantial
economic injury to the insured. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 579, 510
P.2d 1032, 1041-42, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 489 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.
2d 425, 433, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 (1967); Anderson v. Continental
Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 695-96, 271 N.W.2d 368, 378 (1978). "Obviously, where...
the claim is actionable and has resulted in substantial damages apart from those due
to mental distress, the danger of fictitious claims is reduced. . . ." Crisci v. Security
Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 (1967).
There is a split of authority as to whether substantial economic injury is itself a
prerequisite to recovery for emotional distress, see Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co.,
85 Wis. 2d 675, 695-96, 271 N.W.2d 368, 378 (1978). See Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group,
Inc., 93 Cal. App. 3d 642, 155 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1979), in which the court permitted the
award of damages for emotional distress although the tort caused no independent
economic or property injuries other than attorneys' fees to prosecute the claim. The
court regarded the defendant's refusal to pay substantial insurance proceeds that
were due under its policy with plaintiff as sufficient "to establish the genuineness of
his claim for mental distress." Id. at 659, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
Delos probably reflects the California position, considering the recent case of
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831
(1980). In that case, plaintiff alleged the tort of negligent infliction of emotional dis-
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losses not foreseeable at the time of execution of the con-
tract,' and punitive damages.7
As fascinating as the remarkable growth of this fledgling
tress and, despite the absence of impact or injury, sought recovery for emotional dis-
tress damages allegedly incurred when his wife was negligently misdiagnosed by de-
fendant as having syphillis. In upholding plaintiff's claim, the court abolished the
impact or injury rule, in favor of an ad hoc "genuineness" test. Quoting from Rodri-
gues v. State, 52 Hawaii 186, 472 P.2d 509 (1970), the court stated: "In cases other
than where proof of mental distress is of a medically significant nature. . . the gen-
eral standard of proof required to support a claim of mental distress is some guaran-
tee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case." Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167
Cal. Rptr. at 839 (footnotes omitted).
Based upon the premises and the holding of Molien, it is likely that in bad faith
tort cases in California the court will not insist upon proof of substantial economic
injury but will instead view each case on its merits to determine whether, in the con-
text of all the facts, it appears reasonably certain that plaintiff did indeed suffer emo-
tional distress and that emotional distress was a reasonable consequence of defen-
dant's tort.
6. See, e.g., Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 460-62, 521 P.2d
1103, 1108-10, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 716-18 (1974); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.
v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 620, 540 P.2d 1070, 1071 (1975); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638, 643 (N.D. 1979); Christian v.
American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 904 (Okla. 1978).
7. Punitive damages are not an essential concomitant of defendant's tortious con-
duct. The bad faith required for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is not necessarily tantamount to the malevolent state of mind required for punitive
damages.
The terms "good faith" and "bad faith," as used in this context ... are not
meant to connote the absence or presence of positive misconduct of a malicious
or immoral nature - considerations which, as we shall indicate below, are
more properly concerned in the determination of liability for punitive dam-
ages. Here we deal only with the question of breach of the implied covenant
and the resultant liability for compensatory damages. As stated by the drafts-
men of the Restatement of Contracts, "[t]he phrase 'good faith' is used in a
variety of contexts, and its meaning varies somewhat in the context. Good faith
performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other
party; it excludes [from consideration] a variety of types of conduct character-
ized [in other contexts] as involving 'bad faith' because they violate community
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness."
Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 21 Cal. 3d 910, 921-22 n.5, 582 P.2d 980, 986 n.5, 148
Cal. Rptr. 389, 395 n.5 (1978) (footnote omitted).
Only when the "bad faith" breach was accompanied by an odious state of mind
sufficient to constitute oppression, fraud or malice will punitive damages be allowed.
See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 819, 598 P.2d 452, 457,
157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 487 (1979); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 91
Nev. 617, 620, 540 P.2d 1070, 1071 (1975); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Montoya, 90 N.M.
556, 557, 566 P.2d 105, 106 (Ct. App. 1977); Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 44,
46, 273 N.E.2d 919, 921 (1970); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 696-
97, 271 N.W.2d 368, 379 (1978).
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tort (whose name has yet to be agreed upon,8 but which will
be referred to herein as the tort of bad faith breach of con-
tract'), is the fact that no court has expanded its ambit be-
yond insurance-related transactions, such as when an insur-
ance company has unreasonably refused to pay insurance
proceeds due the insured ° or unreasonably failed to settle
third party claims against the insured.1 While a wealth of
8. Legal writers have used varying labels when reviewing the development of
this new tort. One writer, obviously displeased with the courts' attempt to af-
ford more protection to insureds, referred to it as the tort of the "Insurer's
Mistaken Judgment." Others, attempting to describe the purpose of the tort,
have referred to it as the "New Tort of Outrage," "Gruenberg-ian Tort," "Tort
of Bad Faith," "Tortious Breach of Contract," and "Tortious Interference with
a Protected Property Interest."
Comment, The New Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: Christian v. American
Home Assurance Corp., 13 TuLSA L.J. 605, 625 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
9. As stated, traditionally the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was
utilized by the courts to find breach of contract from conduct that did not violate any
express provision of the contract. See cases cited note 1 supra. Because breach of
that implied covenant created contractual remedies only, there was no need to refer
to it when the promisor's bad faith conduct constituted a breach of an express cove-
nant. However, breach of the implied covenant of good faith, and therefore tort liabil-
ity, need not be limited to cases in which the promisor's misconduct was only implic-
itly prohibited by the contract. The implied covenant of good faith is, after all, a
representation that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the
other to receive the benefits of the agreement. A wilful, unexcused refusal to perform
express provisions of the contract manifestly meets that test. The courts which have
imposed tort liability in first party insurance cases, in which the insurer unreasonably
refuses to pay proceeds due the insured in violation of expressed contractual obliga-
tions, have recognized that breach of an express covenant will not immunize the
promisor from tort liability. See cases cited note 10 infra. So, despite the statement
in Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13,
17 (1967), that "[Iliability is imposed not for a bad faith breach of the contract but
for failure to meet the duty to accept reasonable settlements, a duty included within
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing," the cases and common sense
have established that a bad faith breach of expressed contractual obligations is also a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The tort may, there-
fore, be appropriately designated as the tort of bad faith breach of contract.
10. See, e.g., United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28 (Alaska 1974);
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973);
Grand Sheet Metal Prods. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. Supp. 46, 375
A.2d 428 (1977); First Security Bank v. Goddard, 593 P.2d 1040 (Mont. 1979); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070 (1975); Corwin
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1979);
Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d 919 (1970); Christian v. Ameri-
can Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978); Anderson v. Continental Ins.
Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978).
11. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13 (1967); Lange v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 290 Minn. 61, 185 N.W.2d 881 (1971).
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scholarly writing has been published discussing the propriety,
parameters and consequences of the tort as it applies to insur-
ance companies,12 there has been a dearth of analysis as to
whether and when it should be expanded to encompass other
bad faith breaches in other commercial contexts. 13 Judicial
discussion is almost as sparce. 14 This article addresses that
relatively untouched question. When, if at all, should the tort
of bad faith breach of contract be extended beyond insurance
transactions?
II. JUDICIAL HESITANCE AND PROFERRED RATIONALE
Few cases have confronted the foregoing question. In a re-
cent California case, Wagner v. Benson, 5 plaintiff had
obtained financing from Lloyds Bank for investment in a cat-
tle raising program. His visions of wealth dissipated with the
decline in the value of cattle, resulting in the bank's foreclos-
ing on the loan and selling Wagner's cattle. Wagner claimed
that the bank had breached its covenant of good faith, and
subjected itself to tort liability when it failed to advise him of
the unworthiness of the investment. That creative argument
failed. The court, however, rejected the idea that the tort was
limited to insurance cases.
12. See, e.g., Kircher, Insurer's Mistaken Judgement - a New Tort? 59 MARQ. L.
REv. 775 (1976); Zurek, First Party-Insurance Claims Practices & Procedures In
Light of Extra Contractual Damage Actions, 27 DRAKE L. REv. 666 (1978); Note,
First Party Torts - Extra-Contractual Liability of Insurers Who Violate the Duty
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 900 (1976); Comment, Good Faith
and Fire Insurance Contracts, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 847 (1975); Note, Tort of In-
surer's Bad Faith Refusal to Pay First Party Claims, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 579 (1980);
Note, Insurance - Increasing Liability for Refusal to Pay First Party Claims: Bad
Faith and Punitive Damages, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 685 (1977); Comment, Insur-
ance - The "Full Bloom" Tort of Bad Faith Remains in the Bud, 57 OR. L. REv. 590
(1978); Comment, Tort Liability for an Insurer's Bad Faith Refusal to Settle: A De-
veloping Trend Appropriate for Adoption in Missouri, 45 Mo. L. REv. 103 (1980);
Comment, The New Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: Christian v. American
Home Assurance Corp., 13 TULSA L.J. 605 (1978).
13. Because these articles have specifically directed their discussion to insurance
cases, analysis of the tort's relevance to other commercial relationships has generally
been lacking. One article did note that "[a] logical expansion of this new tort theory
would extend it to other businesses which are governmentally regulated to a substan-
tial degree," and that "this new tort could have tremendous impact on the whole of
contractual relationships." Comment, The New Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Con-
tract: Christian v. American Home Assurance Corp., 13 TULSA L.J. 605, 624 (1978).
14. See cases cited notes 15 & 18 infra.
15. 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980).
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In every contract there is an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything
which injures the right of the other to receive the benefits of
the agreement .... A breach of this duty may be a tort as
well as a breach of the underlying contract .... However,
not every breach of the covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing creates liability on tort. A bad faith cause of action
sounding in tort has never been extended to contractual re-
lationships other than in the insurance field. ... This does
not mean such claims are limited only to insurance transac-
tions .... 16
Finding no conduct on the part of the bank that could even
approach bad faith, the court found no need to consider when
a bad faith breach of a commercial contract should be re-
garded as tortious.17
Other courts have expressly rejected an expanded applica-
tion of the tort of bad faith of contract.18 Judicial attempts to
justify that rejection have been made, but none have been
persuasive. One court countered arguments for expanding the
tort to noninsurance transactions simply by noting the ab-
sence of precedent for expanded application."9 Steadfast ad-
herence to this approach would, of course, have precluded the
birth, not merely the expansion of this infant tort.
Others have suggested that although the tort is founded
upon the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, which is implied as a matter of law in all contracts, 20 it is
tortious only in insurance cases because of the special fiduci-
ary responsibilities the insurer owes the insured.2" However,
assuming such a relationship exists,22 there is nothing in that
16. Id. at 33, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
17. Id. at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
18. See, e.g., Iron Mountain Security Storage v. American Specialty Foods, Inc.,
457 F. Supp. 1158, 1163-69 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Ma-
rina View Heights Dev., Inc., 66 Cal. App. 3d 101, 135 n.8, 135 Cal. Rptr. 802, 822 n. 8
(1977); Farris v. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 284 Or. 453, 463, 587 P.2d 1015, 1020 (1978)
(dictum).
19. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Marina View Heights Dev., Inc., 66 Cal.
App. 3d 101, 135 n.8, 135 Cal. Rptr. 802, 822 n.8 (1977).
20. See note 1 supra.
21. See, e.g., Iron Mountain Security Storage v. American Specialty Foods, Inc.,
457 F. Supp. 1158, 1166-69 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Farris v. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 284 Or.
460, 463, 587 P.2d 1015, 1018 (1978).
22. A few courts have refused to apply the tort of bad faith breach of contract to
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distinguishing characteristic which compels limitation of the
tort to transactions involving a fiduciary relationship. Torts
involving fraud, negligence or intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress may stem from breach of contract, but their
commission does not depend upon proof of a fiduciary rela-
tionship.23 Unless the presence of such a relationship is essen-
tial to satisfy the underlying policy behind the tort, there is
no particular reason to impose it as a prerequisite to liability.
Another profered rationale for limiting the tort to insur-
ance contracts is that "insurance contracts continue to be con-
tracts of adhesion, under which the insured is left little choice
beyond electing among standardized provisions offered to
him .... 24 Thus, since insurance contracts are not negoti-
ated agreements, courts are justified in abandoning a strict
contractual approach to the breach of such "agreements. 2 5
first party insurance cases, where the insurer refuses to pay proceeds due the insured,
on the ground that no fiduciary relationship exists between the insurer and the in-
sured in such cases.
The cases from other jurisdictions holding an insurer liable in tort. . . pro-
ceed on the theory that the insurer has a special relationship to the insured
which warrants the imposition of an independent legal duty to deal fairly with
the insured .... They find precedent for such a duty in the cases holding an
insurer to a duty of reasonable care in the settlement of third-party liability
claims.... However, the policies that warranted recognition of such a duty to
the insured in the third-party liability claim are inapplicable in the case of the
first-party claim. "The dilemma presented by the absolute control of trial and
settlement vested in the insurer by the insurance contract and the conflicting
interests of the insurer and insured" in the third-party claim requires that the
insurer recognize the conflict and give due regard to the interests of the in-
sured.... This dilemma is lacking in the first-party claim. The insurer is not
in a position to expose the insured to a judgment in excess of the policy limits
through its unreasonable refusal to settle a case .... We therefore find no
basis for extending the duty recognized in those cases to the first-party claim.
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N:H. 607, 614, 392 A.2d 576, 580-81
(1978) (footnotes omitted). Accord, Baxter v. Royal Indem. Co., 285 So. 2d 652, 656
(Fla. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 317 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1975).
23. Several jurisdictions which have been unwilling to impose tort liability for an
insurance company's breach of its implied covenant of good faith have at the same
time held that any contracting party, including insurance companies, may be liable
for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress if the breach is sufficiently
wilful and odious. See, e.g., Florsheim v. Travelers Indem. Co., 75 IlL App. 3d 298,
310, 393 N.E.2d 1223, 1233 (1979); Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911, 918 (Iowa
1976); Krajenke v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 68 Mich. App. 211, 218-19, 242 N.W.2d
70, 73-74 (1976).
24. Iron Mountain Security Storage v. American Specialty Foods, Inc., 457 F.
Supp. 1158, 1167 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (footnotes omitted).
25. Id.
1981]
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But adhesion contracts are hardly the exclusive domain of the
insurance industry.20 If there is in fact a logical basis for limit-
ing the tort's application to adhesion contracts, 7 subjecting
those who commit bad faith breaches of noninsurance adhe-
sion contracts to tort sanctions would still seem appropriate.
Perhaps the most forthright, if not the most satisfying ex-
planation for the disinclination to expand the tort was offered
in Iron Mountain Security Storage v. American Specialty
Foods, Inc. 2s There, a federal district court, after first
stressing its generalized concern about imposing tort liability
for breach of contract,2 noted that if the tort of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing were extended beyond
insurance contracts, most contract violators would be subject
to tort liability since "the violation of most contracts involves
a breach of faith."30 Anything that common, the court seemed
to imply, cannot be all that bad. But the court did not explain
why such bad faith breaches, despite their frequency, should
not be deemed social wrongs justifying tort liability.
While the rationales offered by courts for their refusal to
expand the tort of bad faith breach of contract beyond insur-
ance contracts are rather unpersuasive, attempts by plaintiffs
to expand application of the tort have generally been unsuc-
cessful. Further, efforts by litigants to impose tort liability
upon those who breached contracts in bad faith, under alter-
native theories or labels, have generally fared with equal lack
of success.31
26. Murray, Uncodscionability: Unconsionability, 31 U. PrrT. L. R.v. 1 (1969);
Rotkin, Standard Forms: Legal Documents in Search of An Appropriate Body of
Law, 1977 ARiz. ST. L.J. 599 (1977); Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in Cali-
fornia, 48 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1 (1974). See also authorities cited notes 89-91 infra.
27. See discussion in text accompanying notes 90-92 infra.
28. 457 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
29. "Most courts have been cautious about permitting tort recovery for contrac-
tual breaches and we are in full accord with this policy. .. ." Id. at 1165, quoting
Glazer v. Chandler, 414 Pa. 304, 308-09, 200 A.2d 416, 418 (1964).
30. Id. at 1165 n.7, quoting Hoy v. Gronoble, 34 Pa. 9, 11 (1859).
31. The most common alternative approach has been to seek to have intentional
breaches designated as a tortious interference with contractual relations. See gener-
ally Estes, Expanding Horizons in the Law of Torts - Tortious Interference, 23
DRAKE L. Rav. 341, 350-52 (1974). With near unanimity, courts have rebuked the
approach, limiting that tort's application to third-party efforts. See, e.g., Dryden v.
Tri-Valley Growers, 65 Cal. App. 3d 990, 999, 135 Cal. Rptr. 720, 726 (1977); Daly v.
Nau, 167 Ind. App. 541, 549, 339 N.E.2d 71, 76 (1975); W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF VIE
LAW OF TORTs § 129, at 934 (4th ed. 1971); Harper, Interference with Contractual
[Vol. 64:425
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IH. THE UNDISCLOSED UNDERLYING RATIONALE
Placed in proper historical perspective, the unexplained ju-
dicial reluctance to impose tort liability upon those who, in
bad faith, breach contractual obligations is not only under-
standable but reflects a perceived awareness of, and faithful-
ness to, one of the most poorly kept secrets in legal history:
Bad faith breach of contract, if defined as an intentional
breach motivated by crass economic self-interest, has been,
despite a clamoring of moral credos to the contrary, a judi-
cially accepted staple of our system of commercial law. While
some have condemned the wilful contract breaker as a repul-
sive, evil aberration, woefully disrupting moral quietude, 2 a
close scrutiny of commercial law doctrine, and the briefest
scrutiny of commercial practice, makes it transparently clear
that our system not only sanctions such bad faith breaches,
but, with limitations, actually encourages them.33
The promisee seeking judicial redress for breach of con-
tract has a rather paltry remedial arsonal at his disposal. He
is generally limited to recovery of compensatory damages, and
only for those economic injuries which were foreseeable conse-
Relations, 47 Nw. U. L. Rlv. 873, 873 (1953). But see, Cherberg v. Peoples Natl
Bank, 88 Wash. 2d 595, 564 P.2d 1137 (1977), discussed in note 96 infra.
32. "From antiquity the moral obligation to keep a promise had been a cardinal
tenet of ethical philosophers, publicists, and philosophical jurists." Pound, Promise or
Bargain?, 33 TuL. L. REV. 455, 455 (1959). "Why should promises be enforced? The
simplest answer is that of the new intuitionists, namely, that promises are sacred per
se, that there is something inherently despicable about not keeping a promise, and
that a properly organized society should not tolerate this." Cohen, The Basis of Con-
tract, 46 HIAv. L. Rnv. 553, 571-72 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Cohen]. See generally
H. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PmvATE CoNmRACT 69-71 (1961); G. PATON, A TEXT-
BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 296 (1946); Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damages Mea-
sures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. Rv. 273, 281-84 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Birmingham]; Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the
Basis of Contract, 89 YmJm L.J. 1261, 1261 (1980). "Repudiators of fair and solemn
and binding promises are commercial sinners. If they are unrepentant, courts should
hold them to the full consequences of their sins." Lagerloef Trading Co. v. American
Paper Prods. Co., 291 F. 947, 956 (7th Cir. 1923). "The faithful observance of con-
tracts.., is essential to the public welfare .... Property rights, public and private
morality, and liberty itself, are insecure, when the law encourages the nonobservance
of contract obligations." Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light &
Water Power Co., 171 F. 553, 561 (6th Cir. 1909).
33. "[I]t is an open secret that a contract breaker rarely stands to lose as much by
his breach as he would by performance. And the more deliberate the breach, the more
apt he is to gain." Mueller, Contract Remedies, Business Fact and Legal Fancy, 1967
Wis. L. REv. 833, 835 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Mueller].
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quences of breach at the time the contract was made.3 4 The
more extensive proximate cause test employed for tort liabil-
ity, the limits of which are primarily defined by the vague
concept of remoteness viewed from the time of breach of duty
rather than the time of commencement of the undertaking,3 5
is inapplicable. Neither damages for emotional distress 6 nor
punitive damages3 7 may be recovered. With minor exceptions,
these limitations apply irrespective of whether the breach was
intentional or innocent, in good faith or in bad faith. 8
34. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 354, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854); D. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.3 (1973); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 330
(1932); L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 196 (1965); 11 S. WILLIS-
TON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1344 (3d ed. 1961).
35. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 257 (4th ed. 1971);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965); Green, Foreseeability In Negli-
gence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1961).
36. See, e.g., Westwater v. Grace Church, 140 Cal. 339, 73 P. 1055 (1903); Brunson
v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955); Lamm v. Shingleton, 231
N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d 810 (1949); Adams v. Brosius, 69 Or. 513, 139 P. 729 (1914). See, 5
A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1076 (1960); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAM-
AGES § 145 (1935); 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1341 (3d
ed. 1961); Comment, Recovery for Mental Anguish from Breach of Contract: The
Need for an Enabling Statute, 5 CAL. W. L. REV. 88 (1968).
An exception to this general rule is that contracts whose primary purpose is to
assure the peace and tranquility of the promisee, such as funeral arrangement con-
tracts, may subject the promisor to liability for emotional distress proximately caused
by breach. See, e.g., Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196 P.2d 915 (1948); Fitzsim-
mons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n, 91 Colo. 544, 17 P.2d 535 (1932); Stewart v. Rudner,
349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957) (contract to deliver baby by Caesarean-section
operation).
37. See, 5 A. Corbin, supra note 1, § 1077; Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for
Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1146 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Farns-
worth]; Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 639, 658 (1980); Simpson, Punitive Damages For Breach of Contract,
20 OHIo ST. L.J. 284, 284 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Simpson]; Sullivan, Punitive
Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and- the Illusion of Legal Change, 61
MINN. L. REv. 207, 207 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan]; Comment, Exemplary
Damages in Contract Cases, 7 WLAmErrE L.J. 137, 138 (1971); Annot., 84 A.L.R.
1345 (1933).
38. As with any generalized statement, exceptions may be found. There is author-
ity that the limitations of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)
are inapplicable when defendant's breach is in bad faith, allowing plaintiff to recover
"even those [damages] which could not be foreseen at the time of the making of the
contract." Overstreet v. Merritt, 186 Cal. 494, 505, 200 P. 11, 16 (1921). See also, C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 141 (1935); Bauer, Consequential
Damages in Contract, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 699 (1932); Comment, The Inadequacy
of Hadley v. Baxendale as a Rule for Determining Legal Cause, 26 U. PITT. L. REv.
795, 807 (1965).
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Such a remedial system may provide ample incentive to
breach a contract, at least when the profits to be gained or
losses to be avoided by breach are greater than the limited
liability imposed for breach. For example, assume that Seller,
a manufacturer of widgets, has contracted to supply Buyer
with all widgets Buyer may require for a specified period at a
unit price of $1.00. Subsequent to formation of the contract,
Seller has the opportunity to reallocate its resources, cease
production of widgets and commence manufacturing wadgets,
which have a market value of $2.00, without increasing pro-
duction costs. If the market price for widgets is $1.30 per unit,
resulting in damages to Buyer of at least $.30 per unit,3s Seller
will be economically induced to breach its contract4 ° and real-
locate its resources since the gains from breach, $1.00 per
With respect to those contracts in which breach may justify the award of damages
for mental suffering because of the highly personal nature of the subject matter of the
contract, see note 36 supra. Proof that the breach was wilful and in bad faith may be
a prerequisite to the reward of such damages. See, 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1341 (1960); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 341 (1932). But
see Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 211, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445, 448 (1980).
Some courts have allowed punitive damages for bad faith breach of contract by
labeling such conduct as fraudulent, thereby permitting recovery on a tort theory,
despite the fact that there was no proof of requisite fraudulent intent at the time of
execution of the contract. See, e.g., Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S.C. 108, 115, 49 S.E. 232,
234 (1904).
But, as a general rule, fault is an irrelevant concern in measuring damages for
breach so that "[i]f a contract is broken the measure of damages generally is the
same, whatever the cause of the breach." Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co.,
190 U.S. 540, 544 (1903). See also Farnsworth, supra note 37, at 1147.
39. "[T]he measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller is the
difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach
and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages
. " U.C.C. § 2-713.
40. Section 2-306 of the U.C.C. imposes, fittingly, good faith limits upon the
buyer's power to modify requirements in a requirements contract and the seller's
power to modify output in an output contract. The section is silent, however, as to
seller's power to cease production in a requirements contract. While there is some
authority that "there is no implied obligation to continue in business," so long as
cessation is in good faith, Duboff v. Matam Corp., 272 App. Div. 502, 503, 71
N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (1947), there is counter authority that it is purely a question of
contractual interpretation and a contract could be construed as imposing an absolute
duty to continue production irrespective of the reason for cessation. See Gutman v.
Sal-Vio Masons, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 729, 339 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1972), aff'd, 45 App. Div. 2d
988, 359 N.Y.S.2d 766 (1974). Even if the seller has the power to cease for good faith
reasons, proof of unprofitability in continuation may not, of itself, establish the good
faith necessary to excuse further performance. See Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons,
Inc., 37 N.Y.2d 466, 335 N.E.2d 320, 373 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1975).
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unit, will significantly exceed Buyer's legal damages.41
Justification for a system which encourages breach is not
to be readily found from examination of judicial decisions. In
their zeal to deny that the law provides incentive to breach,
the courts necessarily were compelled to avoid discussion of
why the law provides such an incentive.42
Despite judicial obfuscation, the reasons for these restric-
tive rules of damages are apparent and understandable. Not-
withstanding. judicial denials, intentional breaches of contract,
rather than being scourges upon the citizenry are, within lim-
its, perceived as in furtherance of social policy which must be
encouraged, not inhibited. The social policy begins with a rec-
41. If special circumstances existed, of which Seller had reason to know at the
time of execution of the contract, such as the fact that Buyer would be unable to
procure widgets from an alternative source, Buyer's consequential damages might be
sufficiently great to wipe out Seller's gains from breach. U.C.C. §§ 2-713, 2-715(2)(a).
42. [O]ne of the principal impediments to analysis of contract cases treating
the question of punitive damages is the consistent absence, particularly in the
early cases, of any meaningful judicial discussion of the philosophy of damage
law.... Whatever the explanation, we must begin without any firm idea of
why, beyond adherence to traditional English standards, American courts have
held, as a general rule, that punitive damages should not be awarded for
breach of c6ntract.
Sullivan, supra note 37, at 221.
The prohibition against recovery for mental suffering in contract cases has been
explained, although not satisfactorily. While it is apparent from an empirical stand-
point that mental suffering is in fact "the natural result of a breach of contract,"
Jankowski v. Mazzotta, 7 Mich. App. 483, -, 152 N.W.2d 49, 51 (1967), recovery for
that injury has been denied on the ground that it is too remote, Wstwater v. Grace
Church, 140 Cal. 339, 342, 73 P. 1055, 1056 (1903); Adams v. Brosius, 69 Or. 513, _
139 P. 729, 731 (1914), or that it was not within the contemplation of the parties at
the time of execution of the contract and, therefore, must be denied under the rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Brunson v. Ranks Army
Store, 161 Neb. 519, __, 73 N.W.2d 803, 807 (1955); Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C.
10, - 55 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1949). The former rationale is conclusory, not explana-
tory. Mental suffering is remote only because it is so designated, not because it is
distant in space, time or foreseeability. The latter rationale would be supportable if
the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale were based on the theory that parties are liable only
for damages to which they have tacitly agreed, irrespective of foreseeability. See, e.g.,
Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 543 (1903). It is tenable to
conclude, in the absence of language to the contrary, that parties to commercial con-
tracts did not intend to be liable for damages caused by emotional distress, no matter
how foreseeable. But the tacit agreement theory has generally been repudiated. See,
e.g., 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1010 (1960); 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 1357 (3d ed. 1961); Farnsworth, supra note 37, at 1208; Perillo, Resti-
tution in a Contractual Context, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1208, 1217-18 (1973). Since the
rule of Hadley v. Baxendale is theoretically based on foreseeability, not agreement,
the denial of foreseeable emotional distress damages cannot be justified by that rule.
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ognition that if breaches are too harshly sanctioned, there will
be deterrence not only of breach but of the execution of con-
tracts.43 Therefore, damages must not be so oppressive as to
discourage the formation of binding commercial agreements."
But far more important is an awareness that intentional
breaches of contract often promote the economic efficiency of
society. To the extent the promisor's pecuniary gains from
breach exceed the promisee's pecuniary injuries, the costs of
production have been reduced. Were legal liability to exceed
the promisee's pecuniary injuries, an efficient reallocation of
resources would be discouraged at societal expense.'5
It is in society's interest that each individual reallocate
his resources whenever it makes him better off without mak-
ing some other unit worse off. Since reallocation through
breach will not make the injured party worse off if his ex-
pectations are protected by preserving his planned alloca-
tion of resources, and will, by hypothesis, make the party in
breach better off, it is in society's interest that the contract
be broken and the resources be reallocated.46
The rules of contract damages were framed to incorporate this
43. "[I]f damages are awarded to secure expectation interest in order to encourage
the making of contract promises, to introduce damage measuring law which goes be-
yond the value of expectations may introduce a deterrent to the very contract making
behavior to be encouraged." Hartzler, The Business and Economic Functions of the
Law of Contract Damages, 6 AMER. Bus. L.J. 387, 392 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Hartzler]. Accord, Farnsworth, supra note 37, at 1208; Goetz & Scott, Enforcing
Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980).
44. Gardner, An Inquiry Into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, 46 HAnv. L.
REv. 1, 29 (1932); Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal
Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REv. 335, 342 (1924); Speidel, An Essay on the Reported
Death and Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1162-63 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Speidel]; Developments in the Law - Competitive Torts, 77
HARv. L. REv. 888, 967 (1964); Note, Damages Recoverable in an Action for Inducing
Breach of Contract, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 232, 240 (1930). See also authorities cited
note 43 supra.
45. "To penalize such adjustments through overcompensation of the innocent
party is to discourage efficient reallocation of community resources." Birmingham,
supra note 32, at 284. Accord, Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1,
15-16 (1960); Farnsworth, Damages and Specific Relief, 27 AsR. J. Cois1. L. 247,
247-48 (1979); Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compen-
sation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554, 558 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Goetz & Scott]; Spei-
del, supra note 44, at 1162; Note, Measuring Contract Damages - Policy and the
Advantageous Breach, 47 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335, 1340 (1972).
46. E. FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoNTRAcTS 20 (1980).
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socio-economic premise.47 It is, therefore, by design and not
by accident that our manufacturer of widgets has been delib-
erately encouraged to breach its contract so as to permit an
efficient reallocation of society's resources.
As envisioned, our system not only encourages the eco-
nomically efficient breach, it discourages the inefficient
breach. If our manufacturer of widgets sought to avail itself of
the increased market price for widgets by selling the con-
tracted for goods to an alternative purchaser, its gain per wid-
get would be at least equalled by buyer's losses in having to
pay the increased market price from an alternative seller.
There is, therefore, no socio-economic justification for breach.
Seller's gains are at buyer's expense. The incentive to commit
this inefficient breach is, theoretically, removed by our reme-
dial system which will render seller liable to buyer for the dif-
ference between market price and contract price,48 thereby
offsetting gains from breach by liability for breach.
From a theoretical perspective, it is evident why courts
have been reluctant to make the bad faith breach of contract
a separate tort. Despite its onerous appellation, the bad faith
breach, if defined as an intentional, wilful, selfishly induced
breach of contract, is often an anticipated, expected and en-
couraged reality of commercial life. Designating such conduct
as tortious would significantly jeopardize that reality in mea-
suring pecuniary damages by the tort standard of proximate
cause rather than the far more restrictive contract stan-
dards,49 by allowing recovery for emotional distress, and by
47. Sometimes financial advantage lies in the breach rather than the perform-
ance of a contractual duty. Perhaps a man ought to keep his promises but our
law of contract damages will occasionally make default the more attractive al-
ternative. In general, when the law induces a breach, default rather than per-
formance will produce the more efficient allocation of our community re-
sources. The obligee may be disgruntled, the public indifferent, but the analyst
will perceive a social end. The breaking point at which discouragement yields
to encouragement (to breach) is clearly a function of the measure of contract
damages.
Note, Measuring Contract Damages - Policy and the Advantageous Breach, 47 No-
TRE DAME L. REv. 1335, 1340 (1972) (footnote omitted). See generally authorities
cited note 45, supra. See also M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 102 (1933); L.
FULLER & R. BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 55 (1964); Barton, The Economic Basis
of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 277-78 (1973).
48. U.C.C. §§ 2-712, 2-713.
49. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Hadley v. Baxendale, of course, limits
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subjecting the promisor to punitive sanctions.5 0 The disincli-
nation of courts to extend the tort of bad faith breach of con-
tract beyond the realm of insurance cases is, therefore, reflec-
tive of basic contract theory. If extended to typical
commercial transactions to make breaches of contracts tor-
tious when the breaches were intentional and motivated by
economic self interest, the law of contracts would be revolu-
tionized. Such an expansion could undermine the ancient
precepts upon which the law of contracts stands by inhibiting
economically efficient, socially beneficial breaches. Further,
since conduct is generally classified as tortious only when it is
sufficiently repugnant to be designated a societal wrong,51 it
would be inappropriate to label an activity that is sanctioned,
even encouraged, as tortious.
IV. THE UNFOUNDED PREMISE OF CONTRACT THEORY:
DAMAGES DETER THE INEFFICIENT BREACH
The economic underpinnings supporting the system of lim-
ited liability for breach of contract rest upon one fundamental
premise - the sine qua non of contract remedial law. The
the amount of pecuniary injuries that are compensable for breach. Denying recovery
for actual pecuniary injuries sustained does not appear to comport with an economic
efficiency analysis, since in fact the promisor's gains may exceed the promisee's actual
injuries and still breach will be encouraged because the gains will exceed compensa-
ble injuries. The justification for the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, however, is not
that it promotes economic efficiency, but that it encourages entry into commercial
transactions. See text accompanying notes 43 & 44 supra. By permitting the parties
to know in advance the consequences of breach, Hadley reduces the uncertainty of
contracting, thereby increasing the incentive for entering commercial transactions.
See Farnsworth, supra note 37, at 1207; Hartzler, supra note 43, at 394; Speidel,
supra note 44, at 1163.
If we may assume that the defaulting promisor is usually an entrepeneur, a
businessman who has undertaken a risky enterprise, the law here manifests a
policy to encourage the entrepeneur by reducing the extent of his risk below
that amount of damage which, it might be plausibly argued, the promisee has
actually been caused to suffer.
Patterson, supra note 44, at 342.
50. See generally authorities cited notes 45-47 supra.
51. "Since tort liability is ultimately imposed to achieve a desirable social climate,
'public policy' plays a major role in determining the standard of conduct required by
a particular factual situation." Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 34, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 516, 520 (1980) (footnote omitted). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 3, at 15-16 (4th ed. 1971); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort
Theory, 85 HAnv. L. Rv. 537 (1972); Cowan, The Victim of the Law of Torts, A
Morality Play in Prologue and Dialogue, 33 ILL. L. REV. 532 (1939).
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premise is that because the promisor must compensate the
promisee for damages caused by breach of contract, the prom-
isor will be encouraged to breach only when the breach is eco-
nomically efficient, that is when the gains from breach exceed
legal damages; and will be discouraged from breaching when
breach is not economically efficient, that is, when gains from
breach do not exceed legal damages.2 To the extent that pre-
mise is honored, the system is in fact in furtherance of per-
ceived goals - permitting a fair and efficient reallocation of
resources while promoting stability and security in the market
place53 - since in the great majority of transactions gains
from breach will not exceed the amount of legal liability.5
Sadly, this sine qua non is among the missing premises of
our times. Despite scholarly willingness to assume that the
system works,55 in practice promisors continually breach al-
though the gains from breach are more than offset by the
promisee's legal damages. 56 What superficially appears to re-
flect either shortsightedness or economic masochism may be
explained by a more mundane, if not equally crass, thesis. The
promisor often finds breach attractive not because anticipated
gains from the breach exceed anticipated losses, but because
he expects never to pay for that liability.5 7 Imbued with that
disdainful premise, the promisor has no particular need to
consider the extent of legal liability in determining whether
breach is financially expedient. For example, one who con-
tracts to sell goods at a specified price theoretically has no
incentive to breach his contract when market price rises, since
the gains derived by selling to an alternative purchaser at the
higher rate will be offset by the promisee's legal damages.58
52. See authorities cited note 55 infra.
53. See note 68 infra.
54. Barton, supra note 47, at 278.
55. "Generally, breach will occur where the breaching party anticipates that pay-
ing compensation and allocating his resources to alternative uses will make him 'bet-
ter off' than performing his obligation." Goetz & Scott, supra note 45, at 558. See
also Birmingham, supra note 32, at 284. See generally authorities cited notes 45-47
supra.
56. H. Havighurst, supra note 32, at 73; E. MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN
CONTRACT LAW 10 (1970) [hereinafter cited as E. MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL]; Farnsworth,
supra note 37, at 1147 n.11; Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963); Mueller, supra note 33, at 835-36.
57. See text accompanying notes 78 & 79 infra; Mueller, supra note 33, at 835-36.
58. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
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But if the seller never intends to compensate the promisee for
his legal damages, this economic disincentive to breach
evaporates.
The assumption made by many breaching promisors that
damages need not be paid is often a rational one. If the prom-
isor does not voluntarily compensate the promisee for his
damages, litigation must be commenced and attorneys' fees
incurred. Those fees will generally not be recoverable as an
element of damages or costs against the promisor, irrespective
of the latter's liability.5" In cases where the damages suffered
are not substantial, the expenses of litigation often make a
lawsuit financially unavailing, resulting in abandonment of
the claim.60 In other cases, because protracted litigation is ex-
pensive and because trial invariably includes the risk of de-
feat, the promisee is often reluctantly willing to settle the case
for an amount substantially less than actual damages.6 1 More-
over, if a lawsuit is commenced and pursued to completion,
with ultimate judgment against the promisor, the promisor
will face liability in the amount he should have voluntarily
paid years before, subject only to an unimposing interest pen-
alty running from the time payment should have been made62
59. See 5 A. CoRmN, CoNTRAcrs § 1037 (1960); C. McCoRMICK, A HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 61 (1935); Comment, Recent Developments In Attorneys'
Fees, 29 VAND. L. REv. 685 (1976).
60. Mueller, supra note 33, at 836. Farnsworth, after explaining the economic jus-
tice of our legal system, noted in passing that "[o]f course a legal system that falls as
far short as does ours of recognizing the costs of litigation when awarding relief may,
for that reason, fail to attain that goal in practice." Farnsworth, supra note 37, at
1147 n..
61. Take a seller who has agreed to deliver certain readily marketable goods at
a price lower than the market at time of delivery. If he does not deliver, he can
sell the goods elsewhere at the higher price. Buyer is then entitled, as damages,
to the same differential as was realized by the seller, with perhaps a few dollars
for the expense of repurchase in the market. Thus, the law says, buyer is made
whole and seller is stripped of his ill-gotten gain. But when buyer's unrecover-
able costs involved in accomplishing this end are considered (his lawyer's fees,
his own lost time, the lost time of his employee-witnesses), it is a rare buyer
who will bother to sue unless he wants to teach the seller a lesson or unless the
amount involved is large. And in the latter case, a seller has better than an
even chance of settling at a figure under his market gain as long as that figure
will be over the net amount the buyer stands to realize from his suit.
Mueller, supra note 33, at 835-36. See also H. Havighurst, supra note 32, at 73; E.
MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL, supra note 56, at 10.
62. See Baum, Statutory Control of Damages in Commercial Transactions, 12
HASTINGS L.J. 191, 198-200 (1960); Comment, Prejudgment Interest: An Element of
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- a punishment which, in this period of inflation, is an
incentive.
Faced with these inoffensive prospects, a breach to achieve
immediate gain at the risk of unlikely loss, is often the wisest
financial alternative. Of course a continual pattern of breach
with concomitant loss of goodwill may jeopardize the viability
of one's enterprise."3 But occasional breaches, selectively in-
flicted upon innocuous promisees whose disappointment does
not seriously threaten the continuation of the promisor's busi-
ness, are encouraged by the present system, irrespective of
whether the promisee's injury will exceed the promisor's gain.
In a system in which a breach, coupled with a refusal to pay
resulting damages, is often its own reward, it is not surprising
that intentional breach often occurs. Defective products are
sold, shoddy services are rendered, obligations both express
and implied are ignored because the sanctions for such con-
tractual breaches are, too often, only theoretical.
The system has been corrupted. The tail is wagging the
dog, and in a most perverted way. A remedial system which
was intended to deter intentional breaches, except in limited
situations, has, by its very irrelevance, become the determina-
tive element in inducing intentional breaches which serve no
societal function and which are, therefore, in violation of
moral and economic concepts of justice.6 4 The remedial
scheme of contract law was premised on the promisor's recog-
nition of the economic consequence of actually having to pay
an injured promisee's damages. The reality is the promisor's
recognition of the economic consequence of not actually hav-
Damages Not to Be Overlooked, 8 CuM. L. REv. 522 (1977), for a discussion of inter-
est penalties in breach of contract cases.
63. The man who does not keep his promises is not exactly a pariah, but he
loses much that the great majority of people find essential to an agreeable exis-
tence. Anyone who has a history of failing to keep his word is stamped as un-
worthy of trust, and his chance of future benefit through contract is
diminished.
H.. Havighurst, supra note 32, at 71. See Mueller, supra note 33, at 836.
64. The encouragement, by absence of remedial sanctions, of intentional breaches
resulting in gains exceeding the promisee's pecuniary injuries, does not constitute ab-
solution of the immorality of breach. See note 32 supra. Rather, it reflects the view
that the societal gains from such breaches exceed societal losses. Birmingham, supra
note 32, at 281. Consequently, breaches which have no such economic justification are
in contravention of both moral and economic justice.
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ing to pay the promisee's damages. As long as this reality ex-
ists, the justice of the law of contract remedies is a fiction.
V. THE SOLUTION: GREATER SANCTIONS FOR THE WILFUL
INEFFICIENT BREACH
it would have been possible to have developed a contrac-
tual system of remedies that would have impeded, if not pre-
vented, the present reality. Since contract remedies were in-
tended to encourage only those breaches resulting in gains in
excess of the promisee's losses, the courts could have ex-
panded contract damages and penalties for breaches not
meeting those criteria. The reasons courts chose not to expand
the remedial scheme can only be conjectured. Perhaps, when
viewed from the perspective that fault is, theoretically, an ir-
relevant element of contract law, a means for distinguishing
between the tolerable and the intolerable intentional breach
was not perceived.65 Perhaps because of steadfast judicial re-
luctance to admit that any intentional breaches were en-
couraged, the courts were unwilling to create a system which,
in bifurcating remedies, admitted the sanctity of some inten-
tional breaches.66
The pubescent tort of bad faith breach of contract could
very well provide a solution to the dilemma, while leaving con-
tract remedies intact. Because tort law, unlike contract law,
has fault as a component of its genetic ancestry,67 it has the
power to condemn the faulty, socially repugnant breach, while
leaving the justifiable intentional breach unscathed. Since the
rules defining contract damages are themselves a reflection of
perceived justice, a breach resulting in gains which exceed
those damages is permitted, and even encouraged, in further-
ance of recognized social policies. Consequently such breaches
should not, and need not, be regarded as tortious. The pro-
ducer of widgets who found that reallocating his resources to
produce wadgets would result in profits in excess of the
buyer's damages has engaged in no societal wrong. His deci-
65. "In its essential design ... our system of remedies for breach of contract is
one of strict liability and not of liability based on fault .... " Farnsworth, supra
note 37, at 1147. See also Simpson, supra note 37, at 284.
66. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
67. See generally authorities cited in notes 45-47 supra. See also Hall, Interrela-
tions of Criminal Law and Torts: II, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 967 (1943).
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sion to breach was anticipated and intended by the framers of
contract remedies. Conversely, a wilful breach, induced by an-
ticipated gains that will not exceed the promisee's compensa-
ble losses is an unjust one, inconsistent with the tenets of con-
tract law, promoting no social goals and ripping the fabric of
societal integrity and commercial stability. 8 Consequently, it
should be regarded as tortious.
Examples of such socially repugnant breaches which
should be regarded as tortious, include those resulting when
the promisor seeks to benefit from rising prices by selling
promised goods to an alternative purchaser at the higher mar-
ket price; 9 when the promisor who, having been paid, deliber-
ately sells defective goods;70 or, when the promisor, having in-
nocently sold defective goods, refuses to honor his expressed
obligation to repair them. 1 In each of these situations, the
breach is socially detrimental and unworthy. The gains from
each breach will be equalled or exceeded by the promisee's
legal damages and the incentive for the breach will be the ex-
pectation that those damages will not be paid by the
promisor.
Courts have justifiably been hesitant to make all wilful
breaches of contract tortious. Such a rule could defeat, rather
68. In a developed economic order the claim to promised advantages is one of
the most important of the individual interests that press for recognition. If it is
a task of the legal order to secure reasonable individual expectations so far as
they may be harmonized with the least friction and waste, in an economic or-
der those arising from promises have a chief place. Credit is a principal form of
wealth. It is a presupposition of the whole economic order that promises will be
kept. Indeed, the matter goes deeper. The social order rests upon stability and
predictability of conduct, of which keeping promises is a large item.
3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENc E 162 (1959). See also H. Havighurst, supra note 32, at 64;
E. MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL, supra note 56, at 2; Cohen, supra note 32, at 573, 591;
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest In Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 61
(1936).
69. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
70. The buyer may be able to cancel the contract and recover money already paid
as well as damages for nondelivery. U.C.C. § 2-711. If the buyer does not cancel, he is
still entitled to damages equal to the difference in the value of the goods as repre-
sented and as delivered as well as incidental consequential damages. U.C.C. § 2-714.
71. Ordinarily, the seller does not undertake to cure defectively delivered mer-
chandise although he may have the right to do so as an alternative to paying damages
for breach of warranty. U.C.C. § 2-508. If, however, the seller does expressly contract
to repair or replace defective goods, then failure to comply with that representation
would itself constitute a breach of warranty. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2301(6)(B) (1976).
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than promote, certain social policies. If, however, the bad
faith breach is defined not as a wilful breach induced by eco-
nomic self-interest, but as a wilful breach induced by the ex-
pectation of gains that will be equalled or exceeded by the
promisee's contractual damages, the fundaments of contract
law are not only unimpeded, they are affirmatively advanced.
The proliferation of bad faith breaches of contract, as de-
fined herein, necessarily is a consequence of the inability of
the injured promisee to recover the damages to which he is
entitled, inasmuch as the promisor can profit by breach only if
he is not held accountable for those damages. 72 By designating
such breaches as tortious and subjecting one who commits a
bad faith breach to tort liability, with tort guidelines for eval-
uating compensatory damages,73 including damages for emo-
tional distress,7 4 punitive damages75 and attorneys' fees, 78 the
inclination to commit such bad faith breaches would be signif-
72. It is this reality which most forcefully explains the inclination of courts to
impose tort liability in first-party insurance cases. See text accompanying notes 78 &
79 infra.
73. See note 7 supra.
74. See note 6 supra.
75. See note 5 supra.
76. The rule which precludes recovery of attorneys' fees in contract actions, see
note 59 supra, is ordinarily equally applicable to tort actions. See generally C. Mc-
CORMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 61 (1935); Comment, Recovery of
Attorneys Fees From Third Party Tortfeasors, 66 CALiF. L. REv. 94, 95 (1978). A
recognized exception has been that attorneys' fees incurred in a third-party action
when prosecution or defense was necessitated by defendant's tortious conduct, may
be recovered. Id. at 97; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914 (1979); Annot. 45
A.L.R. 2d 1183 (1956).
There is a split of authority as to whether attorneys' fees may be received for
litigation expenses directly incurred in prosecuting an action against an insurance
company whose bad faith refusal to pay insurance proceeds necessitated the action.
Compare Twentieth Century-Fox Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 85 Cal. App. 3d 105, 114,
149 Cal. Rptr. 313, 319, (1978) (denying recovery) with Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers
Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 363-64, 118 Cal. Rptr. 581, 584 (1975) and Corwen
Chrysler-Plymouth v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638, 643 (N.D. 1979)
(allowing recovery).
If attorneys' fees are to be limited exclusively to third-party litigation expenses
then, necessarily, the holding in Twentieth Century-Fox is correct. But if the theory
behind the tort of bad faith breach of contract is to discourage those breaches moti-
vated by the expectation that the promisee will not be able to afford legal redress,
attorneys' fees are an essential element of damages. Even if plaintiff is unable to
prove emotional distress or the right to punitive damages, see notes 5 & 7 supra, the
allowance of attorneys' fees alone will be sufficient incentive to induce plaintiff to
vindicate his rights and, therefore, to induce defendant not to make the bad faith
breach.
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icantly reduced. The plague of broken promises presently in-
duced by the conviction that the promisee cannot afford to
obtain vindication in a court of law could thereby be
controlled.
VI. RECONCILIATION WITH INSURANCE CASES
An insurance company's wilful breach by unreasonably re-
fusing to pay insurance proceeds due the insured is a classic
example of a bad faith breach of contract as defined herein.
The company does not breach because it has discovered an
alternative allocation of resources, the gains of which exceed
the promisee's expected losses. When the contractual obliga-
tion breached is one to pay money, damages for the breach
must at least equal the money that has not been paid.71 The
insurance company's breach results in a gain to the company
only if it is not required to pay the damages caused by breach.
Its gains are exclusively at the promisee's expense. By delay-
ing payment, the company can hope for a settlement at a sum
less than the contract required to be paid, or even total aban-
donment of claims. Its refusal to perform is a clear example of
a bad faith breach; and perhaps, the most cogent explanation
of why the tort of bad faith breach ever developed is that tort
sanctions were essential to prevent such breaches by insur-
ance companies.
Unless prevented by the courts, it is to the interest of a
disability insurer to engage in protracted and unwarranted
litigation.78
A person who buys ... insurance is a consumer and de-
serves legal protection which is realistic. If the law does not
vindicate his reasonable consumer's expectations until only
years after battling well-heeled corporate entities and then
77. In some jurisdictions, the damages for breach of a contractual obligation to
pay money are limited to the amount of money due and owing plus legal interest.
See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3302 (Deering 1972); Abbey v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 281
Minn. 113, 160 N.W.2d 709 (1968); Evans v. Pacific Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 367 S.W.2d 85
(Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1963). Others apply the standard of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex.
341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), which would allow the unpaid promisee to recover
additional consequential damages but only if those damages were foreseeable conse-
quences of breach at the time of execution of the contract. See Gordon v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E.2d 849, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, cert. denied, 410
U.S. 931 (1974).
78. See J.A. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, 16 INS. L. & PRAC. § 8881, at 636 (1968).
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only gives him policy proceeds (plus interest) from which he
must deduct the tontingent fee and gnawing expenses of liti-
gation, then the insurance industry has every illicit incentive
in the world to fight the Bad Fight and nothing to lose (but
policy proceeds plus interest). In this context, compensatory
and contract damages don't really compensate .... Repa-
ration plus admonition are urgently required .... 7
There is no reason to limit this truth to insurance companies.
The breach resulting in gains which depend upon the nonpay-
ment of legal damages should be discouraged in all facets of
commercial life. Tort sanctions for such socially unacceptable
conduct are ample discouragement.
VII. PRAGMATIC CONCERNS ABOUT SUBJECTING THE WILFULLY
INEFFICIENT BREACHER TO TORT LIABILITY
Judicial acceptance of the tort of bad faith breach of con-
tract requires not only acknowledgement of its theoretical
propriety but confidence in its practical application. If the po-
tential benefits of tort liability are outweighed by its potential
detriments then, of course, tort liability should be avoided.
A. Overkill: Will the Tort Substantially Deter Desired
Conduct?
In this regard, two concerns must be overcome. First, the
fear of tort liability must not be so great as to discourage the
making of contracts that would have been entered in good
faith. Second, the fear of tort liability must not be so great as
to significantly discourage the breaking of contracts that
would have been broken in good faith, that is when the gains
from breach would have exceeded contract damages and,
therefore, would have been in the social interest. If tort liabil-
ity will significantly discourage either the making or breaking
of such contracts, its imposition may do more harm than
good.
Were tort liability imposed solely because an intentional
breach in fact resulted in gains that were exceeded by the
promisee's contract damages, the impact upon commercial
79. Lambert, Commercial Litigation, The Case for Punitive Damages (Including
Their Coverage by Liability Insurance), 35 AM. TRIAL LAWYER'S ASS'N L.J. 164, 225-
26 (1974).
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transactions would be severe. Often a party breaches reasona-
bly believing the gains from breach will exceed the promisee's
compensable pecuniary injuries. For example, Buyer, who
promised to produce widgets for Seller and who breached his
contract to produce more profitable wadgets may have had no
reason to know, at the time production ceased, that alterna-
tive sources of widgets would become unavailable, or that the
market value of widgets would skyrocket, causing its legal lia-
bility to exceed the gains from breach.80 If that conduct could
result in tort liability, the "chilling effect" thereby engendered
would deter the efficient allocation of resources. For those not
so deterred, tort sanctions, despite lack of moral culpability,
would follow.
If however, liability is imposed from a perspective of rea-
sonable foresight, rather than hindsight, these concerns
should be overcome. The promisor's breach should be found
tortious only if it can be established that at the time of wilful
breach the promisor could not have reasonably believed his
gains would exceed the promisee's compensable pecuniary
losses. By so limiting the tort, the chilling effect of potential
liability would be minimized, and sanctions would be imposed
only upon those who possessed the requisite moral culpability
justifying their imposition."1
There may be cases in which it cannot be established that
reasonably expected gains from breach would be equalled or
exceeded by expected damages. In such instances, tort liabil-
ity should rightfully be denied. But there will be other cases
where the promisor will be hard pressed to establish that he
reasonably expected his gains to exceed his liability, as where
he deliberately delivers defective goods,82 or deliberately ref-
80. U.C.C. §§ 2-712, 2-713.
81. Since the tort is founded upon breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, unless the breach itself involved moral culpability, the requisite ele-
ment of fault will be lacking, irrespective of the societal detriment caused by breach.
It has been suggested herein that the breach must be wilful or deliberate for liability
to be imposed. The courts may choose, however, to limit fault considerations solely to
the issue of excuse, see note 96 infra, so that unless there was a reasonable justifica-
tion for nonperformance, liability will ensue. That in fact is the standard that has
been applied in first-party insurance cases, where tort liability ensues from the unrea-
sonable refusal to pay insurance proceeds due the insured. See cases cited note 10
supra.
82. See note 70 supra.
[Vol. 64:425
BREACH OF CONTRACT
uses to honor warranty obligations,83 or refuses to deliver con-
tracted for goods so that they might be sold to an alternative
purchaser at a higher market price.8 In these situations, when
the promisor cannot establish the reasonableness of his posi-
tion, tort liability would be appropriate.
B. Will the Tort Cause An Influx of Spurious or
Otherwise Inappropriate Litigation?
The fear of spurious litigation has traditionally affected
the development and shape of tort doctrine, and has occasion-
ally been a relevant factor in refusing to impose tort liability
upon one whose conduct otherwise seemed to justify tort
sanctions.8 5 Designating the bad faith breach of contract as
tortious may cause an influx of litigation. However, that influx
will come almost exclusively from those who previously, al-
though having valid contractual claims, could not afford to
seek judicial redress. Those suffering violation of their con-
tractual rights by bad faith breaches would have the incentive
to seek that redress. But it will seldom be the case that a
spurious action will be filed, since a prerequisite to tort liabil-
ity will be proof of a wilful breach by the promisor.88
Moreover, in the long run, the amount of increased litiga-
tion should be slight. If the sanctions imposed for bad faith
breach are sufficient to induce commencement of litigation by
the promisee, they are also sufficient to -induce avoidance of
the breach by the promisor. Those who previously were in-
clined to breach by the expectation of gains at the promisee's
expense, will, by the spectre of tort liability, be inclined not to
engage in that socially and economically detrimental conduct.
To the extent the tort deters wrongful conduct, and it surely
will, it will decrease the need for litigation.
83. See note 71 supra.
84. See note 48 supra.
85. See W. PROSSER, HAmBoOK OF TE LAW OF ToRTS § 54, at 328 (4th ed. 1971);
Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn:
Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 Durr L.J. 1401,
1403; Comment, Parent-Child Tort Immunity: A Rule in Need of Change, 27 U.
MIAmI L. REv. 191, 195 (1972).
86. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
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VIII. CONCEIVABLE LIMITATIONS
A. Should the Tort be Limited to Those Who Obtained
No Short-Term Profit From Breach?
Occasionally, the gains from the bad faith breach stem
from the savings derived in refusal to perform. The promisor
who refuses to deliver goods or perform services, not because
he has a better offer, but because he has already been paid, is
an example. The promisor who delivers inferior goods or ser-
vices, knowing the breach will not be discovered, if ever, until
after he has been compensated, is another. Such breaches are
in bad faith because the gains derived from breach will be
fully offset by the promisee's legal damages, which, of course,
the promisor never expects to pay.
In other instances, the gains from breach stem from short-
term profits derived in alternative performance, as where a
seller has a prospective buyer willing to pay above contract
price although not above market price. The seller wishes to
increase his profits by selling at the higher price but he can, in
the long run, benefit only if he refuses to pay damages since
the promisee's damages will entirely consume his short-term
profit. 8 7
A court could refuse to apply the tort of bad faith breach
to the latter category, to those who breached, in part, because
they had a better deal, even though their profit depended
upon failure to pay the promisee for his legal damages. There
seems to be a visceral reluctance to extend the tort to these
individuals, but in fact there is nothing societally appealing
about their conduct. They, too, have been motivated exclu-
sively by greed, at the expense of the promisee, without cor-
relative gain to society. Our initial inclination to reward them
for their wrong stems from our constant subjection to such
behavior. We have begun to be immunized by such conduct
because it is so common and abundant. It is unacceptable, re-
pugnant conduct but we accept it. The parties who enter a
contract do so in part to protect themselves from changes in
the market place.88 The party who disregards his contractual
87. U.C.C. §§ 2-712, 2-713.
88. See authorities cited note 68 supra. "There can be no doubt that from an
empirical or historical point of view, the ability to rely on the promises of others adds
to the confidence necessary for social intercourse and enterprise." M. COHEN & F.
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commitment because of such changes in the market, deriving
gains equalled or exceeded by the promisee's damages, has
done his share to tear apart the framework of commercial sta-
bility and societal integrity by adding one more link to the
chain of broken promises and broken trust - a societal ail-
ment that has reached epidemic proportions.8 9 He should as-
sume the consequence.
B. Consumer Transactions
The need for this tort is greatest in consumer transactions.
The nonlegal sanctions for breach of contract, such as loss of
goodwill, often significant in transactions among commercial
enterprises of relatively equal bargaining power, are fre-
quently absent in transactions with isolated consumers.90 Con-
cerns about loss of goodwill may be minimal. Since damages
suffered by the consumer as a result of breach are frequently
not substantial, there is particular incentive to commit the
bad faith breach because of the likelihood that the consumer
will choose not to enforce his legal remedies, inasmuch as the
expenses of litigation probably would exceed legal damages.9 1
For these reasons, a court may choose to initiate or limit ex-
tension of the tort to transactions in which a commercial en-
COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 190 (1951).
89. See generally Jones & Boyer, Improving the Quality of Justice in the Mar-
ketplace: The Need for Better Consumer Remedies, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 357, 357-
62 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Jones & Boyer]; Comment, Nontraditional Remedies
for the Settlement of Consumer Disputes, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 385, 385-86 (1976).
90. "To the extent that others are clamoring to deal with him, the debtor can
afford a disruption of his relation with the creditor and can risk a diminution of his
reputation for fair dealing." H. Havighurst, supra note 32, at 75.
91. When the party breaching the contract is a mass contractor and the other
party is a consumer, the damages measures that the law currently provides are
woefully insufficient .... In the first place, since the consumer in most situa-
tions knows that the most he can hope to collect still will not be sufficient to
reimburse him for the expenses, inconveniences, and uncertainties of suing,
most consumers will not sue. These consumers are thereby effectively denied
any compensation, and the mass contractor is thereby let off without any pun-
ishment for what he has done. Even if the consumer does sue, what the law
awards him is generally short both of what would really be necessary to com-
pensate him for the harms he has suffered from the mass contractor's breach
and of what would be necessary to deter the mass contractor from similar
breaches in the future.
Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 6 (1974).
See also Jones & Boyer, supra note 89, at 360-61; Comment, Nontraditional Reme-
dies for the Settlement of Consumer Disputes, 49 TEmP. L.Q. 385, 385-86 (1976).
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terprise has in bad faith, as defined herein, breached its con-
tract to a consumer promisee.92
C. Special Circumstances - Defense of Privilege or
Excuse
There may be occasions when, although the elements of
the tort have been met, tort liability does not seem appropri-
ate because of special circumstances. For those occasions, the
courts should retain the power to exempt such conduct from
liability. Consequently, a defense of privilege or excuse should
be available.
A court may find, for example, that an intentional breach
is privileged if it was induced, not by the prospect of short
term gains at the promisee's expense but in the avoidance of
significant economic detriment to the promisor. If, for reasons
beyond the promisor's control, the cost of performance is
greatly increased, but the defense of commerical impractica-
bility9" is not available, a court may find that while the prom-
isor has breached, and the avoided losses are exceeded by his
legal liability, it is not the type of breach for which tort sanc-
tions are appropriate.
The breach might also be privileged if it was induced not
by financial motives but by overriding social or personal con-
cerns. If a lessee breaches his year's lease by vacating prema-
turely because he finds the leased premises no longer suitable,
the court may find his breach to be privileged, limiting the
tort's coverage to those breaches motivated solely or primarily
92. Further, to the extent that the generalized distrust and contempt with which
consumers have viewed the business sector is based on accurate perceptions, a reduc-
tion in bad faith breaches in consumer transactions should also reduce consumer dis-
trust and contempt, creating added policy reasons for invoking the tort in this con-
text. See generally Jones & Boyer, supra note 89, at 357-64; Comment,
Nontraditional Remedies for the Settlement of Consumer Disputes, 49 TEMP. L.Q.
385, 385-86 (1976). "[In 1967] the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
... concluded that consumer grievances - real or imagined - were one of 12 major
grievances that contributed to the sense of alienation, tension and frustration that
made rioting and civil unrest a stark reality in our cities." Kass, S.2589 and the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code: A Comparison of Consumer Protections, 37 GEO. WASH.
L. Ray. 1131, 1131 (1969).
93. U.C.C. § 2-615. See Schlegel, Of Nuts, and Ships, and Sealing Wax, Suez,
and Frustrating Things - The Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 23
RUTGn L. Rv. 419 (1969); Sommer, Commercial Impracticability - An Overview,
13 DuQu sNE L. Rav. 521 (1975).
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by economic considerations.
An area of special concern relates to the buyer who has
received goods or services and then refuses to pay. Like the
insurance company which refuses to pay proceeds, the buyer's
breach would ordinarily be in bad faith, as his economic bene-
fits are offset by the seller's legal damages. 94 Will collection
agencies now have an additional remedial weapon to collect
debts by threatening tort liability for nonpayment, resulting
in a tort which haunts the consuming public? Such a conse-
quence can be avoided by applying the tort only against com-
mercial enterprises, for the reasons noted above. 5 Or a court
may find that such a wilful refusal to pay is tortious unless
the buyer can establish changed circumstances since the
purchase, that have resulted in tightened economic conditions
which, while not excusing breach, might excuse tort liability
for the breach.
There will be other situations that justify the assertion of
privilege. Rather than attempt to enumerate a predetermined
list of such situations, the ultimate parameters of this defense
should be developed by the judiciary as the facts of particular
cases dictate.9 "
IX. CONCLUSION
Justifiably, courts have been hesitant to extend the tort of
bad faith breach of contract beyond insurance-related cases.
Contract law is based in part upon the assumption that cer-
tain intentional breaches are to be encouraged. Permitting
parties to breach their contracts promotes an efficient econ-
94. See note 77 supra.
95. See text accompanying notes 90-92 supra.
96. With the element of excuse as a defense, the tort becomes similar to that de-
scribed in Cherberg v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 88 Wash. 2d 595, 564 P.2d 1137 (1977). In
that case, the court held that a wilful contract breaker may be found in violation of
the tort of interference with contractual relations if the breach was unprivileged - a
matter to be determined on a case by case basis, considering such factors as the na-
ture of the breach, the character of the promisee's expectancy interest, the relation-
ship between the parties, and the interest sought to be advanced by the promisor. Id.
at 604-05, 564 P.2d at 1143-44. Aside from the fact that the labels differ - a matter
of monumentally irrelevant concern - there is much similarity between the two
torts. A refinement, if not a difference, is that as proposed in this article a breach
would not be tortious as a bad faith breach of contract if it was economically efficient
for the reasons discussed above. For a discussion of Cherberg, see Note, Intentional
Interference With Business Expectancies, 1 WHrrrmR L. Rav. 119 (1978).
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omy, at least when the gains from breach exceed the expected
pecuniary injuries of the promisee. By limiting the tort of bad
faith breach of contract to those breaches which are economi-
cally inefficient, the courts will significantly promote contract
theory by discouraging only those breaches which contract law
has always intended to discourage. Commercial reality will ap-
proach, not flaunt, the theoretical premises of contract law.
